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SUMMARY
The United States maintains a strong,
multifaceted alliance relationship with South
Korea that has for decades served vital inter-
ests of both sides.  Against the background of
continuing difficulties in dealing with North
Korea and the dramatic consequences of the
Asian economic crisis, the two governments
face a range of security, economic, and politi-
cal issues that involve the Congress in its
oversight and  appropriations capacities, and in
frequent exchanges between congressional
offices and the South Korean government.
Heading the list of issues is how to deal
with the  North Korean regime.  Bush Admin-
istration  policy aims to negotiate improved
implementation of the U.S.-North Korean
1994 Agreed Framework to bring about inter-
national inspections of North Korea in line
with the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty.  The Bush Administration also
seeks “verifiable constraints” on North Ko-
rea’s missile program and pullbacks of North
Korean artillery and rocket launchers from
their concentrations on the demilitarized zone
separating North and South Korea.  The Bush
Administration also faces policy decisions on
food aid to North Korea, North Korea’s inclu-
sion on the U.S. terrorism list, and U.S. re-
sponses to South Korea’s “sunshine policy”
toward North Korea.  President Kim Dae-jung
seeks reconciliation with North Korea follow-
ing the historical North-South summit meeting
of June 2001.  He has urged the United States
to engage North Korea and make concessions
to Pyongyang as a support for his policy.  The
Bush Administration’s position on the sunshine
policy is mixed, supporting some elements but
having reservations about others.
The sunshine policy also has resulted in
mounting controversy in South Korea over the
presence of 37,000 U.S. troops.  Growing
numbers of South Koreans seek a reduction of
U.S. military forces.  Incidents between U.S.
military personnel and South Korean civilians
has necessitated U.S.-South Korean negotia-
tions on several such issues.
South Korea is an important economic
partner of the United States.  The United
States has sought to influence South Korean
economic reforms arising from the 1997 Asian
financial crisis.  Bilateral trade disputes have
resurfaced in 2000 and 2001 regarding auto-
mobiles, pharmaceuticals, beef, and steel.
Intellectual property rights remain a point of
contention.
South Korea has become more demo-
cratic politically, a success for U.S. policy
since 1987.  President Kim Dae-jung ap-
proaches the end of his term with declining
popularity and growing criticism over his





The South Korean government stated support for the United States after the September
11 terrorist attacks.  The government intends to provide financial support and reportedly is
considering the dispatch of support troops to the Afghanistan area.  President Bush issued
a policy statement on North Korea on June 6, 2001.  It outlined policy objectives regarding
the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework, North Korea’s missile program, and North
Korean conventional military forces.  North Korean public statements have rejected U.S.
calls resuming negotiations on missiles, asserting that the Bush Administration is seeking
unilateral North Korean concessions on conventional forces pullback from the Korean
demilitarized zone.  North Korea ended its six month boycott of talks with South Korea with
a meeting in September that renewed commitments to agreements reached in 2000.
However, a North-South ministerial meeting in November 2001 ended in failure when North
Korea demanded that South Korea rescind a post-September 11 military alert and agree that
all future meetings would be held in North Korea.  In late November, the Bush
Administration issued statements highlighting North Korea along with Iraq as producers of
weapons of mass destruction and resistant to international inspections. 
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Interests in South Korea
U.S. interests in the Republic of Korea (R.O.K. — South Korea) involve a wide range
of security, economic, and political concerns.  The United States has remained committed to
maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula since the 1950-1953 Korean War.  This
commitment is widely seen as vital to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia where the
territories of China, Japan, and Russia converge.  
The United States agreed to defend South Korea from external aggression in the 1954
Mutual Security Treaty.  The United States maintains about 37,500 troops there to
supplement the 650,000-strong South Korean armed forces.  This force is intended to deter
North Korea’s (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — D.P.R.K.) 1.2 million-man
army, which is deployed in forward positions near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing
North and South Korea.
Since 1991, attention has focused on the implications of North Korea’s drive to develop
nuclear weapons (see CRS Issue Brief IB91141, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,
for background on this set of important issues) and long range missiles.  A bilateral Agreed
Framework designed to ease concerns between North Korea and the United States over
North Korea’s nuclear program was signed on October 21, 1994, and is being implemented.
The United States attempted to negotiate restrictions on North Korea’s development of long
range missiles.  Also of concern is the widespread food shortage inside North Korea.  While
remaining militarily vigilant against North Korean aggression, the United States also strives
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to maintain diplomatic contacts with North Korea in an effort to influence North Korea’s
policies.
The United States  played a major role in fostering South Korea’s remarkable economic
growth, and has carefully monitored and supported international efforts to help South Korea
deal with its current economic and financial crisis, the most serious since the Korean war.
U.S. economic assistance to South Korea, from 1945 to 1971, totaled $3.8 billion.  The acute
financial crisis in late 1997 saw Seoul receive a $57 billion bailout from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) amid strenuous U.S. government and financial sector efforts to fend
off a credit collapse in South Korea.  
The United States is South Korea’s largest trading partner and largest export market.
South Korea is the seventh largest U.S. trading partner.  The United States has long viewed
South Korean political stability as crucial to the nation’s economic development, to
maintaining the security balance on the peninsula, and to preserving peace in northeast Asia.
However, U.S. officials over the years have pressed the South Korean administration with
varying degrees of intensity to gradually liberalize its political process, broaden the popular
base of its government, and release political prisoners.  In recent years, South Korea has
become more democratic. 
At the same time, highlights of a continued close, multifaceted U.S.-South Korean
relationship include repeated summit meetings between U.S. and  South Korean  presidents
and other high level meetings between the two governments. 
Recent Issues
Relations with North Korea
As part of a policy review toward North Korea, President Bush issued a statement on
June 6, 2001, outlining policy objectives related to implementation of the U.S.-North Korean
1994 Agreed Framework on North Korea’s nuclear program, North Korea’s missile program,
and its conventional forces.  He stated that if North Korea took positive actions in response
to the U.S. approach, the United States “will expand our efforts to help the North Korean
people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps.”  Bush stated that he would work with
South Korean President Kim Dae-jung on these issues and other issues between North and
South Korea.  The following is a discussion of the issues listed by President Bush and other
issues between the United States and North Korea.
Nuclear Weapons.  U.S. policy toward North Korea since 1994 has been based
largely on the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework of October 1994.  The Agreed
Framework was negotiated in response to U.S. concerns over nuclear facilities that North
Korea had developed and was expanding at a site called Yongbyon.  Existing facilities
included a five megawatt nuclear reactor and a plutonium reprocessing plant.  Two larger
reactors were under construction.  U.S. intelligence estimates concluded that these facilities
could give North Korea the capability to produce over 30 atomic weapons annually.   North
Korea had concluded a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in 1992, which gave the IAEA the right to conduct a range of inspections of North
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Korea’s nuclear installations.  However, North Korea obstructed or refused IAEA
inspections, including refusal to allow an IAEA special inspection of a underground facility,
which the IAEA believed was a nuclear waste site.  The IAEA hoped that a special inspection
would provide evidence of past North Korean productions of nuclear-weapons grade
plutonium.  U.S. estimates had been that North Korea had acquired enough plutonium for one
or two nuclear warheads.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld increased the estimate to two to
five warheads in a statement of August 2001 in Moscow.
The Agreed Framework provided for the suspension of operations and construction at
North Korea’s known nuclear facilities, the safe storage of nuclear reactor fuel that North
Korea had removed from the five megawatt reactor in May 1994, and the provision to North
Korea of 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually until two light water nuclear reactors are
constructed in North Korea.  The United States is obligated to facilitate the heavy oil
shipments and organize the construction of the light water reactors.  Before North Korea
receives nuclear materials for the light water reactors, it is obligated to come into full
compliance with its obligations as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
especially its obligations to allow the full range of IAEA inspections specified in the North
Korean-IAEA safeguards agreement of 1992.
 The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was created to
implement provisions of the Agreed Framework related to heavy oil shipments and
construction of the light water reactors.  Lead members are the United States, Japan, South
Korea, and the European Union.  Japan and South Korea are to provide most of the financing,
estimated at $5-6 billion, for the construction of the light water reactors.  The Agreed
Framework set a target date of 2003 for completion of the first of the light water reactors.
There have been numerous delays in the project, some caused by North Korea and others by
legal and bureaucratic obstacles.  KEDO officials now project the completion of the first light
water reactor in 2008.  KEDO also has faced rising costs of providing the annual heavy oil
allotments to North Korea.  Since October 1995, North Korea has received the annual
shipments of 500,000 tons of heavy oil.  The cost has risen from about $30 million in 1996
to an estimated $120 million in 2001.  Congressional appropriations for the U.S. contribution
to the financing of the heavy oil shipments has risen from $30 million in FY1996 to $55
million in FY2001.  The Bush Administration requested $95 million for FY2002.  KEDO’s
attempts to secure money from other countries has not filled the gap between U.S. money and
the cost of the oil.
The Agreed Framework came under increasing debate in 2000 and 2001.  Critics
charged that the two light water reactors could give North Korea the ability to produce large
amounts of nuclear weapons grade plutonium.  They cited potential safety problems with the
reactors and asserted that North Korea’s substandard electric power grid could not transmit
electricity produced by the reactors.  They cited delays in implementing the project and the
rising cost of the heavy oil.  Supporters of the Agreed Framework argued that it continues
to fulfill its original aim of shutting down North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear reactors and
plutonium reprocessing plant, which could have produced many nuclear weapons after 1994
if operations had continued.  They acknowledged the safety and grid problems but predicted
that these will be resolved in the future.  (KEDO officials, however, stated that KEDO will
reject North Korean demands that KEDO finance reconstruction of the electric grid.)
Supporters of the Agreed Framework rejected the critics’ claim that North Korea would be
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able to use the light water reactors to produce nuclear weapons, arguing that this type of
reactor is “proliferation resistant.”
The Bush Administration considered the Agreed Framework in its North Korea policy
review in the spring of 2001.  Among the options it considered was a proposal floated by the
Clinton Administration in 2000 to eliminate one of the light water reactors and substitute
conventional power facilities of equal capacity.  President Bush’s policy statement of June 6,
2001, declared an objective of “improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating
to North Korea’s nuclear activities.”  According to Administration officials, the policy will
seek to bring North Korea into compliance with its obligations to the IAEA prior to the point
when the Agreed Framework specifies that North Korea must come into compliance.  U.S.
officials reportedly have said that point will come in the second half of 2003 or in 2004 when
construction of the first light water reactor will reach the stage of delivery of nuclear
components.  However, the IAEA states that, once North Korea allows a full range of IAEA
inspections, the IAEA will need three to four years to determine whether North Korea is in
full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Administration officials point out
that if North Korea does not meet its obligations to the IAEA considerably before 2003, the
light water reactor project would be suspended in late 2003, perhaps up to four years, until
the IAEA was allowed to complete its work.  North Korea has rejected the Bush
Administration’s call for earlier compliance with the IAEA.  Statements by Bush
Administration officials, including the President, in November 2001 pressed North Korea to
begin cooperation with the IAEA immediately.
Suspicions that North Korea was operating a secret nuclear weapons program came into
the open in August 1998 with the disclosure that the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
had concluded that a North Korean underground facility located at Kumchangri was possibly
a nuclear-related installation.  The Clinton Administration responded to the disclosure by
pressuring North Korea to allow the United States access to the Kumchangri facility.  An
agreement was reached on March 16, 1999, providing for multiple inspections of the site in
return for at least 500,000 tons of new U.S. food aid to North Korea.  The first visit took
place in May 1999, a second in May 2000.  Administration officials declared that no evidence
of nuclear activity was found.  However, reports indicated that North Korea had removed
equipment from the facility prior to the first U.S. visit.
The Kumchangri revelation, along with North Korea’s test firing of a long range missile,
resulted in the Clinton Administration’s “Perry initiative.”  Unveiled in October 1999 by
former Defense Secretary William Perry, the Perry initiative set a goal of “verifiable
assurances” that North Korea does not have a secret nuclear weapons program.  The nuclear
side of the Perry initiative made no progress during the Clinton Administration.  After an
inconclusive U.S.-North Korean meeting in Rome in May 2000 on the nuclear issue and the
second U.S. visit to Kumchangri that same month, the Clinton Administration put aside this
element of the Perry initiative, concentrating instead on missiles.  Bush’s June 6 statement did
not mention U.S. suspicions of secret nuclear activities.  However, at the time of the
Kumchangri disclosure, press reports stated that U.S. intelligence agencies were monitoring
at least ten more suspicious North Korean installations.  Thus the issue could arise again.
North Korea’s Missile Program.  On August 31, 1998, North Korea test fired a
three stage missile, dubbed the Taepo Dong-1 by the U.S. Government.  The missile flew
over Japanese territory out into the Northwest Pacific.  Parts of the missile landed in waters
IB98045 12-06-01
CRS-5
close to Alaska.  North Korea claimed that the third stage of the missile was an attempt to
launch a satellite.  U.S. intelligence agencies responded with a conclusion that North Korea
was close to developing a Taepo Dong-1 missile that would have the range to reach Alaska,
the U.S. territory of Guam, the U.S. Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and the
Japanese island of Okinawa, home to thousands of U.S. military personnel and their
dependents.  Reports in early 2000 cited U.S. intelligence findings that North Korea was
developing a Taepo Dong-2  intercontinental missile that would be capable of striking Alaska,
Hawaii, and the U.S. west coast with nuclear weapons.   U.S. and Japanese intelligence
agencies reportedly estimated in 2001 that North Korea had deployed up to 100 medium-
range Nodong missiles.  First tested in 1993, the Nodong missile has an estimated range of
600-800 miles.  The upper range would cover all of Japan including Okinawa.
Throughout the 1990s, North Korea exported short-range Scud missiles and Scud
missile technology to a number of countries in the Middle East.  After 1995, it exported
Nodong missiles and Nodong technology to Iran, Pakistan, and Libya.  According to the
South Korean Defense Ministry in April 2001, North Korea exported 490 Scud missiles and
50 Nodong missiles to Pakistan and Middle Eastern countries from 1985 through 2000.
The test launch of the Taepo Dong-1 missile spurred the Clinton Administration to
intensify diplomacy on North Korea’s missile program; negotiations had begun in 1996.  The
Perry initiative set the goal of “verifiable cessation of testing, production and deployment of
missiles exceeding the parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the
complete cessation of export sales of such missiles and the equipment and technology
associated with them.”  Dr. Perry and other officials seemed to envisage the negotiation of
a series of agreements on the individual components of the North Korean missile program;
each agreement would build progressively toward termination of the entire program.  The
Perry initiative offered North Korea steps to normalize U.S.-North Korean relations, an end
to U.S. economic sanctions, and other economic benefits in return for positive North Korean
actions on the missile and nuclear issues.  This produced in September 1999 a qualified North
Korean promise not to conduct further long-range missile tests, which North Korea repeated
in June 2000.  The Clinton Administration responded by announcing in September 1999 a
lifting of a significant number of U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea.  It published
the implementing regulation for the lifting of these sanctions on June 19, 2000.  
 No further agreements on missiles were concluded by the end of the Clinton
Administration.  After a year of negotiations, North Korea sent a high level official to
Washington in October 2000.  Secretary of State Albright visited Pyongyang shortly
thereafter, and missile talks intensified.  Unlike Perry’s view of a series of agreements, the
Clinton Administration proposed a comprehensive deal covering all aspects of the issue.
North Korea offered to prohibit exports of medium and long-range missiles and related
technologies in exchange for “in-kind assistance.”  It also offered to ban permanently missile
tests and production above a certain range in exchange for “in kind assistance” and assistance
in launching commercial satellites.  Pyongyang also offered to cease the deployment of
Nodong and Taepo Dong missiles.  It proposed that President Clinton visit North Korea to
conclude an agreement.  The negotiations stalled over four issues: North Korea’s refusal to
include short-range Scud missiles in the commitment to cease the development and
deployment of missiles; North Korea’s non-response to the U.S. position that it would have
to agree to dismantle the already deployed Nodong missiles; the details of U.S. verification
of a missile agreement; and the nature and size of a U.S. compensation package.  North
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Korean leader Kim Jong-il told European Union officials in May 2001 that he would continue
a moratorium on missile test launches until 2003, although a subsequent statement of North
Korea’s Foreign Ministry warned that a continuation of the moratorium “depends entirely on
the policy of the new [Bush] administration.”
President Bush’s June 6 statement set a goal of “verifiable constraints on North Korea’s
missile programs and a ban on its missile exports.”  Administration officials have emphasized
the necessity of a strong verification mechanism in any missile accord.  If missile talks resume,
the Administration will face at least four issues.  One will be to determine the minimum level
of U.S. monitoring necessary to insure verification of any agreement — in particular to
determine whether an on-site, challenge inspection system within North Korea will be
required.  The second issue will be to determine whether the ultimate policy goal is the
termination of the entire North Korean missile program or only those parts of it that can be
monitored effectively.  Monitoring of North Korean research, manufacture, and assembly of
missiles would be extremely difficult because North Korea is believed to conduct these
activities in deep underground facilities.  Deployment and dismantlement of missiles as well
as the export of missiles would be easier to monitor, but monitoring of deployments still might
require a system of on-site, challenge inspections inside North Korea.  The third issue will be
whether to continue to seek a comprehensive missile agreement as the Clinton Administration
did in late 2000 or whether to revert to the original Perry concept and seek a series of smaller
agreements on the individual components of North Korea’s missile program.  The fourth issue
will be the form of so-called compensation.  The Bush Administration will have to decide
whether to continue the Clinton Administration’s interest in an arrangement for the United
States to assist in the launching of North Korean satellites.  It also will have to decide whether
to offer North Korea any economic or financial incentives other than increased food aid.
Food aid was the incentive on which the Clinton Administration relied.  North Korea in the
past has demanded $1 billion annually in cash.
Conventional Force Reductions and Pullbacks.  Before and after taking office,
Bush officials stated that the Administration would give conventional force issues priority in
diplomacy toward North Korea.  These officials stressed the objective of securing a
withdrawal of North Korean artillery and multiple rocket launchers from the positions just
north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), where they threaten Seoul, located just 25 miles south
of the DMZ.  The Bush June 6 statement set the goal of “a less threatening [North Korean]
conventional military posture.” Advocates of such an initiative argue that North Korea might
be more interested in a negotiation because of the progressive weakening of its conventional
forces in the 1990s.  They point out that monitoring of a pullback of North Korean artillery
and multiple rocket launchers from the DMZ would be easier to monitor than any agreements
on nuclear or missile issues.  They believe that easing the central military confrontation on the
DMZ is the key to resolving other military issues, including weapons of mass destruction. 
Nevertheless, the Bush Administration faces major difficulties in developing an initiative.
One problem is South Korean reluctance to enter into negotiations on conventional forces,
despite President Kim Dae-jung’s overall emphasis on engagement with North Korea.
President Kim has said that negotiations on conventional forces should be held in the distant
future after other issues have been settled.  R.O.K. officials have voiced concern that an
initiative for conventional force talks could complicate President Kim’s goal of negotiating
a North-South peace agreement before he leaves office in March 2003.   They have argued
that South Korea should have exclusive jurisdiction in negotiating with North Korea on
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conventional forces; the United States, in short, should not participate in such negotiations.
Thus, the Bush Administration will have to convince South Korea to change its positions if
the Administration seeks to offer North Korea a joint U.S.-South Korean proposal for
conventional force talks.  
A second difficulty will be to make a negotiating proposal attractive enough to secure
an affirmative North Korean response.  North Korea’s response to Bush Administration
statements have denounced the Administration for proposing unilateral North Korean
withdrawals from the DMZ.  North Korea also has used this to reject the U.S. proposal to
renew missile talks.  However, North Korean statements also have pointed out that
Pyongyang in the past has proposed conventional force negotiations and pullbacks (these past
proposals have included the total withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea).  Some
experts believe that the Bush Administration will have to include mutuality and military
reciprocity in any proposal for conventional force negotiations.  They argue that the United
States and South Korea will have to offer North Korea a pullback of some U.S. and R.O.K.
forces from the DMZ in order to obtain North Korean agreement to pull back artillery, rocket
launchers, and other forces.  Bush Administration pronouncements on the necessity of North
Korean pullbacks have not included any reference to mutuality or military reciprocity.  As
indicated previously, the President’s June 6 list of possible incentives to North Korea were
political and economic in nature rather than military.  Thus, a key issue for the Administration
is whether it can achieve conventional force negotiations without a reference to mutuality and
military reciprocity in a proposal for negotiations.
North Korea’s Inclusion on the U.S. Terrorism List.  Beginning in February
2000, North Korea began to demand that the United States remove it from the U.S. list of
terrorist countries.  It made this a pre-condition for the visit of the high level North Korean
official to Washington.  Although it later dropped this pre-condition, it continued to demand
removal from the terrorist list.  In response to the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001,
North Korea issued statements opposing terrorism and signed two United Nations
conventions against terrorism.  
The South Korean government also has urged the United States to remove North Korea
from the terrorism list in order to open the way for North Korea to receive financial aid from
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  U.S. law P.L. 95-118, the
International Financial Institutions Act,  requires the United States to oppose any proposals
in the IMF and World Bank to extend loans or other financial assistance to countries on the
terrorism list.  The Kim Dae-jung Administration advised the Clinton Administration in July
2000 to drop from consideration past North Korean  terrorist acts against South Korea.  The
Kim Dae-jung Administration has begun to advocate North Korean admission to the World
Bank and the IMF; it probably calculates that admission, which P.L. 95-118 does not cover,
would be a step toward convincing the United States to remove North Korea from the
terrorism list and thus allow Pyongyang to receive financial aid from these institutions. 
Japan, however, has taken the opposite position, urging the Clinton and Bush
administrations to keep North Korea on the terrorism list until North Korea resolved Japan’s
concerns over North Korean terrorism.  Japan’s concerns are North Korea’s sanctuary to
members of the terrorist Japanese Red Army organization and evidence that North Korea
kidnapped and is holding at least ten Japanese citizens.  The Clinton Administration gave
Japan’s concern increased priority in U.S. diplomacy in 2000.  Secretary Albright raised the
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issue of kidnapped Japanese when she met with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang in October 2000.
A high ranking State Department official met with family members of kidnapped Japanese in
February 2001 and reportedly assured them that the Bush Administration would not remove
North Korea from the terrorism list.  (See CRS Report RL30613, North Korea: Terrorism
List Removal?)  The State Department’s annual report on terrorism for 2001 also cited
evidence that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines, a combination guerrilla
and terrorist group, had received North Korean arms.
Food Aid.  Agriculture production in North Korea began to decline in the mid-1980s.
Severe food shortages appeared in 1990-1991.  In September 1995, North Korea appealed
for international food assistance.  From 1996 through 2000, the United States contributed
over 1.3 million tons of food aid to North Korea through the United Nations World Food
Program.  The Bush Administration announced 100,000 tons of new food aid in May 2001.
The Bush June 6 statement indicated that it would use food aid as a negotiating incentive to
North Korea in diplomacy over nuclear, missile, and conventional force issues.  The Bush
offer to “expand our efforts to help the North Korean people” suggested continued U.S. food
aid but linked in part to progress on issues like missiles, conventional forces, and North
Korea’s nuclear program.  The Clinton Administration used food aid to secure North Korean
agreement to certain types of negotiations and North Korean agreement to allow a U.S.
inspection of the suspected nuclear site at Kumchangri.  Critics have asserted that the use of
food aid in this way negates consideration of two other issues: the weaknesses in monitoring
food aid distribution in North Korea and the absence of North Korean economic reforms,
especially agricultural reforms.  
The U.N. World Food Program has requested donations of 810,000 tons of food for
North Korea in 2001.  It acknowledges that the North Korean government places restrictions
on its monitors’ access to the food distribution system, but it believes that most of its food
aid reaches needy people.  Several private aid groups, however, have withdrawn from North
Korea because of such restrictions and suspicions that the North Korean regime was diverting
food aid to the military or the communist elite living mainly in the capital of Pyongyang.  It
is generally agreed that the regime gives priority to these two groups in its overall food
distribution policy.  The regime, too, has refused to adopt agricultural reforms similar to those
of fellow communist countries, China and Vietnam, including dismantling of Stalinist
collective farms.  While such reforms resulted in big increases in food production in China and
Vietnam, North Korea continues to experience sizeable food shortages year after year
apparently with no end in site.  Food shortages and resultant suffering were reported to be
increasing in 2001.  It is estimated that one to three million North Koreans died of
malnutrition between 1995 and 2001.
Responding to South Korea’s Sunshine Policy.  U.S. responses to President
Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine policy” has been an issue since South Korea achieved a
breakthrough in relations with North Korea with the meeting of Kim Dae-jung and North
Korean leader Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang, June 13-14, 2000.  Their joint declaration said
North Korea and South Korea would work for economic cooperation, cultural and sports
exchanges, and meetings of divided Korean families.  The summit apparently was in part the
result of Kim Dae-jung’s speech in Berlin in March 2000.  He offered to provide large scale
economic aid to rebuild North Korea’s infrastructure.  Following the summit, Seoul and
Pyongyang negotiated agreements on the restoration of a railway and road across the DMZ,
investment guarantees and tax measures to stimulate South Korean private investments in
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North Korea, provision of 600,000 tons of South Korean food aid to North Korea, and flood
control projects for the Imjim River.  A military dialogue also began with a meeting of defense
ministers.  President Kim called on the United States to support his sunshine policy by
normalizing diplomatic relations with North Korea and negotiating a missile agreement with
Pyongyang, and removing North Korea from the U.S. terrorist list. 
The issue of whether the Bush Administration supports President Kim Dae-jung’s
sunshine policy has been discussed since the Bush-Kim summit in March 2001.  U.S.
statements during the summit seemed to indicate that the Bush Administration had
reservations about President Kim’s policy.  The substantive issues for the Bush
Administration seems to be two-fold.  One is the U.S. response to the component parts of the
sunshine policy, since it involves a number of South Korean initiatives and policy positions.
The Clinton and Bush administrations supported South Korea’s proposals to build a railroad
and road across the demilitarized zone and assist North Korea in flood control of the Imjim
River.  They also supported North-South agreements to reunite divided Korean families and
for investment guarantees for R.O.K. firms investing in North Korea.
However, the Bush Administration appears to have reservations over other components
of the sunshine policy.  As stated previously, the Bush and Kim administration appear to
disagree over North Korea’s inclusion on the U.S. terrorism list.  The U.S. military command
in Korea and the Central Intelligence Agency reportedly believe that North Korea is using for
military purposes the large cash payments, over $400 million since 1998, that the Hyundai
Corporation has made to the North Korean government for the right to operate a tourist
project at Mount Kumgang in North Korea. (According to informed sources, Hyundai has
made secret payments to North Korea, which may bring total payments closer to $800
million.)  The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reportedly delivered a memorandum to the
R.O.K. government in February 2001 outlining U.S. suspicions.   The Kim Dae-jung
Administration has touted the Mt. Kumgang project as a highlight of its sunshine policy.  It
has decided to financially subsidize the project, which has been a big money loser for the
financially troubled Hyundai Corporation.  
The Bush Administration also has reservations over Kim Dae-jung’s proposal that the
1997-1999 Four Party Talks (North and South Korea, the United States, and China) be
reconvened and used for North-South negotiation of a Korean peace agreement to replace
the 1953 Korean armistice agreement.  Past U.S. administrations have endorsed North-South
negotiation of a peace agreement, and President Reagan originally proposed Four Party Talks
as a suitable vehicle for peace negotiations.  However, during the Bush-Kim Dae-jung summit
in March 2001, Bush officials appeared to be skeptical toward President Kim’s peace
initiative.  The Bush Administration appears concerned that a peace agreement without
provisions for conventional forces reductions and pullbacks would create a false sense of
security and could undermine South Korean public/political support for the U.S. troop
presence in South Korea.   
The Bush Administration is known to have expressed reservations to South Korea
concerning North Korea’s proposal that South Korea provide North Korea with 2 million
kilowatts of electric power in the near future.  South Korea did not accept the proposal but
offered to send a survey team to North Korea to study North Korea’s electric system.  The
Bush Administration reportedly is concerned that 2 million kilowatts of electricity is the exact
amount that the two light water nuclear reactors, which North Korea is to receive under the
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Agreed Framework, would provide North Korea.  The Administration reportedly believes that
if South Korea agreed to the North Korean proposal, this would remove incentives for North
Korea to meet its obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency to allow a full range
of IAEA inspections.
The second substantive issue is how the Bush Administration should respond to Kim
Dae-jung’s apparent view that the United States should adopt flexible, or soft, terms with
North Korea on issues like missiles and North Korea’s status on the U.S. terrorism list.
President Kim pressed President Clinton to visit Pyongyang and sign a missile agreement.  He
appears to believe that such U.S.-North Korean agreements have a greater value of
reinforcing the sunshine policy and that this consideration outweighs the terms of agreements.
R.O.K. officials and South Korean supporters of the sunshine policy have urged the Bush
Administration, sometimes through criticism, to adopt flexible positions on issues like
verification of military agreements and North Korean reciprocity.  The Bush Administration
appears to accept this view to a degree regarding economic accords, but Bush officials have
argued for strict verification and reciprocity in military agreements with North Korea.
North Korea’s suspension of talks ended in September 2001 when Pyongyang offered
to meet with South Korea.  The meeting in mid-September reaffirmed agreements of 2000
regarding family reunions, rail and highway connections, and flood control.  North Korea
reportedly pressed South Korea to supply electricity, but there was no agreement.  A
ministerial meeting at North Korea’s Mount Kumgang in November 2001 ended in failure
when North Korea demanded that South Korea end a post-September 11 anti-terrorism alert
and agree that all future meetings would be held in North Korea.  Most informed opinion in
South Korea concluded that there would be a “cooling off period” in North-South talks.
U.S.-South Korean Military Issues
South Korea’s fear of military threat from North Korea has declined since the mid-
1990s.  In June 1999, South Korean naval forces inflicted severe damage on the North
Korean navy in a serious naval clash in the Yellow Sea, which experts attributed to superior
South Korean technology and antiquated North Korean weaponry.  According to recent polls,
South Koreans increasingly do not register the same level of concern as many Americans over
a North Korean invasion threat, suspected nuclear weapons development, ballistic missile
testings, and missile sales abroad.  In congressional testimony in March 2001, General
Thomas Schwartz, U.S. Commander-in-Chief in Korea, asserted that the North Korean
military threat was growing due to the size of its forces (over one million) and armaments,
the holding of large North Korean field exercises in 2000, and especially the concentration
of artillery and multiple rocket launchers within range of the South Korean capital, Seoul.
Schwartz’s testimony received criticism within South Korea and from a number of U.S.
experts.  The critics argue that North Korean conventional military capabilities have eroded
since the early 1990s due to the obsolescence of offensive weaponry like tanks and strike
aircraft, logistics/supplies deficiencies, the absence of major field exercises from 1994 to
2000, food shortages among even North Korean front-line troops on the DMZ, and the
decline in the physical and mental capabilities of North Korean draftees after a decade of
malnutrition.  
   
Declining South Korean fears of a North Korean invasion  and the inter-Korean dialogue
have produced a growing debate in South Korea over the U.S. military presence.  Small
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radical groups, which demand a total U.S. military withdrawal, have become more active and
have been joined by a network of non-government civic groups.  A new element are proposals
by several prominent South Koreans for changes in the size and functions of U.S. troops,
including a proposal to convert U.S. troops to a peacekeeping force.  Polls show a majority
of South Koreans in favor of a reduction in the number of U.S. troops in South Korea.  The
official U.S. position is that the United States has no plans to reduce the number of U.S.
troops in South Korea; the Clinton Administration took a strong public stance against
withdrawals in 2000.  It is known, however, that U.S. military planners have been examining
options for changing the structure of U.S. forces and/or reducing their size.
The North-South summit of June 2000 intensified this debate.  The debate centers on
two issues: (1) the impact of the U.S. military presence on prospects for advancement of
President Kim’s sunshine policy and (2) disputes between the U.S. military and South Korean
civilians.  Attitudes toward one affect attitudes toward the other.  Kim Dae-jung states that
he discussed U.S. troops with Kim Jong-il at the summit and that the North Korean leader
agreed that U.S. troops should remain in South Korea.  Reportedly, however, the two Korean
leaders also discussed changing the role of U.S. troops from a military combat force to that
of peacekeepers.  
This debate has been intensified by new controversy over the conduct of the U.S.
military and related U.S. policy.  A number of incidents and issues in 2000 resulted in
mounting South Korean public criticism of U.S. troops.  The Clinton Administration in its
final days concluded two agreements with South Korea that settled contentious issues.  One
was a new Status of Forces Agreement, completed in December 2000 after six years of
negotiations.  It provides that U.S. military personnel accused of particular, specified crimes
would be turned over to South Korean authorities prior to their trial and that such individuals
would receive certain legal guarantees from the R.O.K. government.  The second agreement
was a settlement of the No Gun-ri issue, which involved the report that U.S. troops had
massacred Korean civilians at No Gun-ri in July 1950 during the early stage of the Korean
War.  The agreement found that U.S. troops had killed a large number of South Korean
civilians at No Gun-ri but that there was no evidence that they were acting under orders from
higher U.S. commanders.  President Clinton issued a statement of regret for the incident, but
the Clinton Administration rejected demands from South Korean groups that the United
States issue a formal apology and pay compensation to surviving family members.  The
Clinton Administration also settled with South Korea the issue of R.O.K. development of
missiles.  South Korea sought agreement to extend the range of its missiles, which had been
the subject of a 1979 U.S.-R.O.K. accord.  An agreement announced in January 2001 will
allow South Korea to develop missiles with a range of up to 187 miles, up from the 1979 limit
of 112 miles.  South Korea will join the global Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR).
Contentious issues remain.  A South Korean court in April 2001 ordered compensation
for 14 Korean civilians, who claimed injury from a U.S. bombing exercise; the court ruled that
the U.S. military had violated Korean law.  This was the first ever ruling against the U.S.
military by a R.O.K. court.  The Bush Administration reportedly has decided to seek a 30
percent increase in South Korea’s host nation support for U.S. troops.  The total cost of
stationing U.S. troops in South Korea is over $2 billion annually.  The current South Korean
direct financial contribution is below $350 million annually.  
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U.S.-South Korean Economic Relations
In 2000, U.S.-South Korean trade totaled over $66 billion, making South Korea the
United States’ seventh largest trading partner.  U.S. exports in 2000 totaled $26.3 billion.
Major U.S. exports include semiconductors, electrical machinery, general machinery, aircraft,
agricultural products, and beef.  After a period of U.S. trade surpluses with South Korea
during 1994-1997, the United States has run deficits with South Korea.  This is partly due to
the economic crisis which hit South Korea in 1997.  In December 1997, South Korea and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to the terms of a $58 billion financial support
package.  The economic recession led to a sharp decline in most countries’ exports to South
Korea, including U.S. exports.  Renewed South Korean economic growth in 1999 and 2000
resulted in a recovery in U.S. exports, but growth in U.S. imports from South Korea was
larger, causing the trade deficit to widen.
As part of its commitment to the IMF in 1997, South Korea pledged to eliminate most
restrictions on foreign direct investment.  The Kim Dae-jung Administration aggressively
liberalized R.O.K. regulations on foreign investment.  As a result American companies have
invested nearly $10 billion in South Korea in the 1998-2000 period.  
During South Korea’s economic crisis in 1997 and 1998, the Clinton Administration
muted U.S. criticism of South Korea’s barriers to foreign companies seeking to sell products
in the Korean market.  Since the spring of 2000, the United States has intensified its pressure
on South Korea.  In early May 2000, the U.S. Trade Representative cited South Korea as a
“priority watch country” under “Special 301" (Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974) because
it deems Seoul’s enforcement of intellectual property rights to be unsatisfactory.  The United
States has stepped up criticism of South Korea for barriers to the sale of U.S. automobiles,
pharmaceuticals, and beef.  In December 2000, the United States and Australia won a
decision of the World Trade Organization that South Korea discriminated against foreign
suppliers of beef.  The United States continues to criticize South Korea for other policies,
which Washington claims discriminate against U.S. beef.  In August 2001, the U.S. Federal
Aviation Administration refused a bid by Korean Air to expand airline service to the United
States, citing lax safety procedures by Korean Air.
A surge in U.S. imports of Korean steel in 1997 and 1998 has caused the United States
to include South Korea in a group of steel-exporting countries being investigated for alleged
dumping of steel products into the U.S. market.  The Bush Administration is considering
initiating safeguard measures under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 to slow steel
imports from South Korea and other countries.  The U.S. International Trade Commission,
an independent U.S. agency, ruled in October 2001 that several categories of imported
Korean steel had caused serious damage to the U.S. steel industry.  The Commission will
recommend remedial action to President Bush, which could include higher tariffs and/or
quotas.  (See CRS Report RL30566, South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations: Cooperation,
Friction, and Future Prospects)
Political Issues
From one perspective, U.S. support for democratization in South Korea has been a great
success for U.S. policy.  As South Korea moved from the authoritarian regimes of the past
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to more democratically-based governments of the last decade, U.S. officials have been
prominent in encouraging greater pluralism and democratic process.  But the process of
democratization has seen greater political instability and uncertainty in South Korea, raising
questions for U.S. policymakers about the South Korean government’s ability to carry out
burden sharing and economic reform programs sought by the United States.
Unlike the authoritarian leaders of the past, former general Roh Tae Woo was the first
popularly elected president in late 1987.  Former oppositionist Kim Young Sam won the
December 1992 presidential election and took office in February 1993.  In 1997, Kim’s ruling
New Korea Party selected Lee Hoi Chang as its candidate for the December 1997 presidential
elections.  Opposition leader Kim Dae-jung won the December 18, 1997 presidential election
with 40% of the vote.  Lee Hoi Chang got 38%.  Kim Dae-jung took power on February 25,
1998.  However, the National Assembly remains controlled by the opposition party.  In a
general amnesty marking the 50th anniversary of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1998,
President Kim released several thousand prisoners including scores of political prisoners and
military officials jailed in connection with past repression activities.  President Kim’s
economic reform program, strong economic growth in 1999 and 2000, and the North-South
summit of June 2000 gained him considerable popular support.  Since late 2000, however,
his popularity has slipped due to a slackening of economic growth and the uneven progress
of his sunshine policy toward North Korea.  President Kim has been criticized for attempting
to impose restrictions on newspapers which criticize his policies.  The next presidential
election is scheduled for December 2002.  President Kim is limited to one term under the
R.O.K. constitution.
